Modified forms of cipher block chaining by Mitchell, Chris J & Varadharajan, Vijay
CIPHER BLOCK CHAINING 
Page 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODIFIED FORMS OF CIPHER BLOCK CHAINING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chris J. Mitchell              Vijay Varadharajan 
Computer Science Department    Hewlett-Packard Laboratories 
Royal Holloway and Bedford     Filton Road 
    New College                Stoke Gifford 
Egham Hill                     Bristol  BS12 6QZ 
Egham                          England 
Surrey  TW20 0EX 
England 
 
 
17th May 1990 
CIPHER BLOCK CHAINING 
Page 2 
Abstract 
 
A long-standing proposal for modifying cipher block chaining 
to prevent data expansion is shown to be insecure in some 
circumstances.  Different modifications are then presented 
which appear secure. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
A block cipher algorithm can be used in a number of different 
ways to encrypt data; four such 'modes of operation' are 
described in ISO Standard 8372, [1].  One well-used such mode 
is Cipher Block Chaining (CBC).  Before describing this mode 
we introduce some notation. 
 
Suppose the block cipher transforms n-bit blocks of plaintext 
into n-bit blocks of ciphertext.  If P denotes such a block of 
plaintext, denote by eK(P) the ciphertext obtained from P by 
encryption under the control of the key K. 
 
To perform Cipher Block Chaining it is first necessary to 
divide the plaintext to be encrypted into a series of n-bit 
blocks, 
P1, P2, ..., Ps 
where, if necessary, the last block is padded out with extra 
bits.  The ciphertext is then computed as 
C1, C2, ..., Cs 
where 
Ci = eK( Pi + Ci-1 )  (1 ≤ i ≤ s) 
and + denotes bit-wise exclusive-or of blocks.  Note also that 
C0 = SV, a 'Starting Variable', which needs to be known to 
both the sender and recipient of the encrypted plaintext. 
 
This mode has one disadvantage, namely the data expansion 
caused by the need to 'pad' the last block to a full n bits.  
In many cases this would not be significant, especially as n 
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would typically be 64 and in many applications data comes 
naturally in blocks of length a multiple of 64.  However, in 
certain special situations data expansion becomes a major 
problem, and it would therefore be desirable to have a way of 
using CBC which does not have this characteristic. 
 
As a result, the latest Draft International Standard concerned 
with Modes of Operation, DIS 10116, [2], contains a modified 
form of CBC.  This modified CBC is of long standing, see, for 
example, p.272 of Konheim, [3], p.94 of Davies and Price, [4] 
or p.76 of Meyer and Matyas, [5].  It is designed to prevent 
data expansion in the case where plaintext messages are not a 
multiple of n bits in length.  The modification only affects 
the encryption of the last block of the data. 
 
It operates as follows.  Suppose the last block of plaintext 
is Ps, of j < n bits.  Suppose also that the penultimate block 
of ciphertext is Cs-1.  Then Cs, the encrypted form of Ps, is 
computed as: 
Cs = Ps + (eK(Cs-1)|j) 
where |j denotes the left-most j bits of a block. 
 
 
2.  Cryptanalysis 
 
Unfortunately, the modified form of CBC described above is, in 
some circumstances, subject to a chosen-plaintext attack which 
will reveal the last plaintext block Ps.  We now describe the 
attack.  Note that we assume that the party responsible for 
encrypting the data will be prepared to encrypt a set of 
plaintext supplied by the cryptanalyst - this is the meaning 
of the term 'chosen-plaintext' attack.  Note also that a much 
weaker version of the attacks described below is outlined on 
p.79 of Meyer and Matyas, [5]. 
 
We consider two different scenarios in which a chosen 
plaintext attack can be successfully launched.  The success of 
the attacks depends on the way in which the Starting Variable 
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is used.  In both cases it is assumed that a plaintext of s 
blocks is encrypted such that the last block is processed as 
above.  It is also supposed that the resulting ciphertext has 
been obtained by a cryptanalyst who wishes to decrypt the last 
ciphertext block Cs to recover the corresponding plaintext Ps. 
 
 
3.  Scenario A 
 
First suppose that the SV, although changing for every data 
set to be encrypted, changes in a predictable way, for example 
being based on a counter which is incremented every time a 
data set is encrypted.  In some circumstances this would mean 
that the SV would not need to be sent or stored with the 
ciphertext, an advantage if communications band-width or 
storage space is at a premium; see, for example, p.97 of 
Davies and Price, [4]. 
 
Suppose the cryptanalyst knows that the next message to be 
encrypted will have X as its SV.  The cryptanalyst now 
constructs a message 
P1, P2, ... 
with the property that 
X + P1 = Cs-1 
and offers it for encryption.  The first block of the 
resulting ciphertext, D1 say, will satisfy 
D1 = eK( X + P1 ). 
 
It is now straightforward to see that the simple computation 
(D1|j) + Cs 
will reveal Ps, and the attack is complete. 
 
Before proceeding note that a similar attack is possible in 
the case where the cryptanalyst is capable of choosing the SV 
as well as the plaintext.  In this case the first block of 
plaintext P1 can be chosen arbitrarily by the cryptanalyst. 
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4.  Scenario B 
 
Suppose next that the same SV is used repeatedly for different 
plaintexts (e.g. SVs are secret and treated as part of the 
key).  The cryptanalyst constructs an arbitrary data set 
P1, P2, ... 
and has it encrypted as 
D1, D2, ... 
where 
D1 = eK( P1 + SV ). 
(note that the cryptanalyst does not need to know SV). 
 
The cryptanalyst now constructs a second data set 
Q1, Q2, ... 
with the property that 
Q1 = P1  and  Q2 = D1 + Cs-1 
and has it encrypted as 
E1, E2, ... 
where 
E1 = eK( Q1 + SV )  and  E2 = eK( Q2 + E1 ) 
and hence 
E1 = D1 
and so 
E2 = eK(Cs-1). 
 
The simple computation 
(E2|j) + Cs 
will reveal Ps, and the attack is complete. 
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5.  Secure modifications to CBC 
 
It should be apparent that the above attacks would not work if 
the SV was changed for every data set in an unpredictable way. 
In this circumstance the above described modified form of CBC 
remains secure.  However, it is not always practical to use 
the SV in this way.  Therefore we conclude this short paper by 
suggesting two different modifications to the CBC computation, 
(one of them apparently novel), neither of which have the same 
problems.  However, both modifications retain the desirable 
property of avoiding plaintext expansion. 
 
The first modification also only affects the encryption of the 
last block of plaintext.  Suppose the last block of plaintext 
is Ps, of j < n bits.  Suppose also that the penultimate block 
of ciphertext is Cs-1.  Then Cs, the encrypted form of Ps, is 
computed as: 
Cs = Ps + (dK( Cs-1 + X )|j) 
where X is a fixed (public) block which is not all zeros, and 
where dK denotes block cipher decryption using the key K. 
 
The second modification, previously described as ciphertext-
stealing in Ref. [5], affects the encryption of the last two 
blocks of plaintext.  Suppose that the last two blocks of 
plaintext are 
Ps-1, Ps 
where Ps is of j < n bits, and let Cs-1 be the ciphertext 
block derived from Ps-1 using 'regular' CBC.  Then set: 
Cs = eK( Ps ; Cs-1|n-j ) 
where X;Y denotes the concatenation of data blocks X and Y, 
and where |k denotes the right-most k bits of a block.  The 
last two ciphertext blocks are then Cs-1|j and Cs.  When 
decrypting, Cs needs to be decrypted before Cs-1|j in order to 
first recover the right-most n-j bits of Cs-1. 
 
Both these modifications appears to resist all types of chosen 
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plaintext attack, although it would seem prudent to subject 
them to further careful analysis before adoption. 
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